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We characterize binary decision rules which are independent and strongly paretian,or independent and almost strongly 
paretian when the individual preferences and the collective preference are weak orders.
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     1 Introduction
Arrow￿ s Theorem (Arrow (1951)) states that, when the domain and the codomain of
a binary decision rule (BDR) are the set of weak orders, and when the BDR is paretian
and satis￿es the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, there exists a
player i0 such that, whenever i0 strictly prefers an option x to another option y, then the
collectivity also strictly prefers x to y. No information is given to the collective preference
when x and y are equivalent for i0 who is called the dictator. The aim of this note is to
characterize, as a consequence of the Arrow￿ s theorem, two subfamilies of arrovian BDRs
by strengthening the Pareto condition. The result obtained on strong paretian BDR is
also obtained by many other authors in di⁄erent frameworks [see Fishburn (1974), Craven
(1992), Hild (2001), Xu (2003)].
2 Notations and de￿nitions
Let N be a the ￿nite set of n voters and A a ￿nite set of m alternatives with n ￿ 2
and m ￿ 3. We will denote by B the set of binary relations on A; W (resp. WN)
the set of weak orders (transitive and complete binary relations ) on A (resp. the set
of pro￿les of weak orders on A). Given a binary relation R on A and a subset fx;yg
of A , we write Rjfx;yg = xy if x is strictly preferred to y and Rjfx;yg = (xy) if the
indi⁄erence holds between x and y. Moreover, given a subset fx;yg of A and two pro￿les
RN and QN, ￿(x;y;RN) is the set of all voters who strictly prefer x to y; the notation




is the pro￿le where preferences of voters in S are given by RS and
preferences of voters in N ￿S by QN￿S. As usual, 2N is the set of all non empty subsets
of N.
De￿nition 1 Let F be a BDR, that is a mapping F from WN to B.
(i) F satis￿es Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if
8RN;QN 2 WN, 8fx;yg ￿ A : RNjfx;yg = QNjfx;yg =) F(RN)jfx;yg = F(RN)jfx;yg:
(ii) F is paretian if
8RN 2 WN;8fx;yg ￿ A : ￿(x;y;RN) = N =) F(RN)jfx;yg = xy:
(iii) F is almost paretian if
8RN 2 WN;8fx;yg ￿ A : ￿(x;y;RN) = N =) F(RN)jfx;yg 2 fxy;(xy)g:
(iv) F is strongly paretian if 8RN 2 WN;8fx;yg ￿ A :
(iv-a)
￿
￿(x;y;RN) 6= ; and ￿(y;x;RN) = ;
￿
=) F(RN)jfx;yg = xy;
(iv-b) ￿(y;x;RN) = ; =) F(RN)jfx;yg 2 fxy;(xy)g:
(v) F is almost strongly paretian if
8RN 2 WN;8fx;yg ￿ A : ￿(y;x;RN) = ; =) F(RN)jfx;yg 2 fxy;(xy)g:
1De￿nition 2 Let F be a BDR.
(i) F is complete if 8RN 2 WN, F(RN) is complete.
(ii) F is transitive if 8RN 2 WN, F(RN) is transitive.
(iii) F is dictatorial if
9i0 2 N= 8RN 2 WN;8fx;yg ￿ A : Ri0jfx;yg = xy =) F(RN)jfx;yg = xy
(iv) F is strongly dictatorial if 9i0 2 N= 8RN 2 WN;F(RN) = Ri0:
(v) F is a lexicographic dictatorship of order q if there exists q distinct voters
i1;i2;:::;iq such that 8RN 2 WN;8fx;yg ￿ A, 8k 2 f1;2;::;qg :
a)
￿
Rikjfx;yg = xy and 8t < k;Ritjfx;yg = (xy)
￿
=) F(RN)jfx;yg = xy;
b) Rikjfx;yg = (xy); 8k < q =) F(RN)jfx;yg = Rqjfx;yg.
For k 2 f1;2;::;qg, ik will then be called the dictator of order k for F and the decisive
dictator for F given S 2 2N is the dictator for F in S with the smallest order.
(vi) F is a lexicographic dictatorship if F is a lexicographic dictatorship of order n.
(vii) F is null if 8RN 2 WN;8fx;yg ￿ A : F(RN)jfx;yg = (xy).
When F is null, F will be called a lexicographic dictatorship of order q = 0.
3 The main result
Let us recall the well-known Arrow￿ s Theorem :
Theorem 1 (Arrow 1951) If F is paretian, IIA, transitive and complete then F is
dictatorial.
We use theorem 1 to establish the following :
Theorem 2 F is strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete if and only if F is a
lexicographic dictatorship.
Proof. (a) Su¢ ciency. Let F be a lexicographic dictatorship.
(a1) Completeness. Let RN 2 LN and fx;yg ￿ A. Suppose that ￿(x;y;RN) [




jfx;yg = (xy). Now suppose that ￿(x;y;RN)[￿(y;x;RN) 6= ; and let
ip be the decisive dictator for F given ￿(x;y;RN)[￿(y;x;RN). Then Fjfx;yg = Ripjfx;yg.
Since Rip 2 W, F is complete.
(a2) IIA. Let RN;QN 2 LN and fx;yg ￿ A such that RNjfx;yg = QNjfx;yg. Sup-
pose that ￿(x;y;RN) [ ￿(y;x;RN) = ;. Then F
￿
RN￿
jfx;yg = (xy). Since RNjfx;yg =
QNjfx;yg, ￿(x;y;QN) [ ￿(y;x;QN) = ;. Hence F
￿
QN￿
jfx;yg = (xy). Now suppose that




jfx;yg = Ripjfx;yg. Since RNjfx;yg = QNjfx;yg, ￿(x;y;QN) [











(a3) Transitivity. Let RN 2 LN and fx;y;zg ￿ A.
(a3-1) Suppose that F
￿
RN￿
jfx;yg = (xy) and F
￿
RN￿
jfy;zg = (yz). Then by the
de￿nition of a lexicographic dictatorship, Rijfx;yg = (xy) and Rijfy;zg = (yz) for all





(a3-2) Suppose that F
￿
RN￿
jfx;yg = (xy) and F
￿
RN￿
jfy;zg = yz. Since F is a
lexicographic dictatorship, Rijfx;yg = (xy) for all i 2 N and ￿(y;z;RN) 6= ;. By transi-




the decisive dictator for F given ￿(y;z;RN) [ ￿(z;y;RN) belongs to ￿(y;z;RN). Hence





(a3-3) Suppose that F
￿
RN￿
jfx;yg = xy and F
￿
RN￿
jfy;zg = (yz). Since F is a lexi-
cographic dictatorship, Rijfy;zg = (yz) for all i 2 N and ￿(x;y;RN) 6= ;. By transitivity,
￿(x;z;RN) = ￿(x;y;RN) and ￿(z;x;RN) = ￿(y;x;RN). Since F
￿
RN￿
jfx;yg = xy, the
decisive dictator for F given ￿(x;y;RN) [ ￿(y;x;RN) belongs to ￿(x;y;RN). Hence





(a3-4) Suppose that F
￿
RN￿
jfx;yg = xy and F
￿
RN￿
jfy;zg = yz. Let ip and iq
be respectively the decisive dictator for F given ￿(x;y;RN) [ ￿(y;x;RN) and given
￿(y;z;RN) [ ￿(z;y;RN). Then ip 2 ￿(x;y;RN) and iq 2 ￿(y;z;RN). Consider ik a dic-
tator for F the order of which is k. Suppose that k < p and k < q. Then Rikjfx;yg = (xy)
and Rikjfy;zg = (yz). By transitivity Rikjfx;zg = (xz). Now suppose that p ￿ q. Then
Ripjfy;zg = yz for p = q or Ripjfy;zg = (yz) for p < q. Hence Ripjfx;zg = xz and ip is the
dictator for F given ￿(x;z;RN)[￿(z;x;RN). Similarly if p > q then Riqjfy;zg = yz and iq








(a4) Strongly Paretian. Consider a pro￿le RN and fx;yg ￿ A.
(a4-1) Suppose that there exists S 2 2N such that ￿(x;y;RN) = S and ￿(y;x;RN) =





(a4-2) Suppose that F
￿
RN￿
jfx;yg = xy. By the de￿nition of F the decisive dictator
for F given ￿(x;y;RN) [ ￿(y;x;RN) belongs to ￿(x;y;RN). Therefore ￿(x;y;RN) 6= ;.
(b) Necessity. Conversely let F be a strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete BDR.
(b1) Since F is strongly paretian, F is paretian and thus F is paretian, IIA, transitive
and complete. By Theorem 1, F is dictatorial. Hereafter the dictator of F is denoted







There is no di¢ culty to observe that F1 is strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete.
3F1 is therefore paretian, IIA, transitive and complete. By Theorem 1, F1 is dictatorial
and the dictator for F2 is denoted i2.
(b2) Suppose that there exists q voters i1, i2, ..., iq with q < n such that i1 is
the dictator for F and for all k 2 f2;:::;qg, ik is the dictator for Fk￿1 where for all







Nk = N ￿ fi1;i2;:::;ikg. Since F is strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete on
WN, it is easy to observe that Fq is strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete on
WNq. By Theorem 1, Fq is dictatorial and the dictator for Fq is denoted by iq+1.
(b3) After n iterations described at (b1) and (b2), F is a lexicographic dictatorship.
Theorem 3 (Arrow bis) If F is almost paretian, IIA, transitive and complete then F
is either dictatorial or null.
Proof. Let F be an almost paretian, IIA, transitive and complete BDR.
Case 1 : Suppose that F is paretian. Then by theorem 1 F is dictatorial.




= N and F
￿
RN￿




















jfx;yg = (xy). Now suppose that z 2 Anfx;yg. Consider a pro￿le RN
1 at
which for all voters, x is the most preferred alternative, z is the second best and y is
the third best. Then by transitivity of individual preferences, x is strictly preferred to
y by all voters. Therefore RNjfx;yg = RN





jfx;yg = (xy). Also
































jfx;zg = (zx). Since QNjfx;zg = RN














jfz;yg = (yz), then by IIA, for






jfz;yg = (zy) holds.







jfz;yg = (zy) holds. Consider a pro￿le RN
2 at which for all voters, x is the most
preferred alternative and y is the second best alternative. Then RNjfx;yg = RN
2 jfx;yg





jfx;yg = (xy). Also observe that RN
1 jfx;zg = RN











jfz;yg = (yz). But QNjfy;zg = RN
2 jfy;zg.




(d) Let prove that for all pro￿le QN and z 2 Anfxg, F
￿
QN￿
jfz;xg = (zx) holds. Just
consider a pro￿le RN
3 at which for all voter i : x and z are ranked according to Qi and are
strictly preferred to any other alternative in Anfx;zg.



























jfx;zg = (xz). But QNjfx;zg = RN
































jfx;zg = (xz). But QNjfx;zg =
RN




To conclude, consider a pro￿le QN and fa;bg ￿ A. First suppose that x 2 fa;bg. Then
by stage (d), F
￿
QN￿




jfa;xg = (ax) and F
￿
QN￿




As conslusion in case 2, F is null.
Theorem 4 F is almost strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete if and only if F
is either null or there exists q ￿ n such that F is a lexicographic dictatorship of order q.
Proof. (i) Su¢ ciency. It is obvious that lexicographic dictatorships of any order q are
almost strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete BDRs.
(ii) Necessity. Conversely let F be an almost strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and
complete BDR.
(ii1) Since F is almost strongly paretian , F is almost paretian and thus F is almost
paretian, IIA, transitive and complete. By the Theorem 3, F is either null or F is
dictatorial.
If F is null, the proof ends and F is lexicographic dictatorship of order q = 0. Oth-
erwise F is dictatorial and its dictator is denoted by i1. Let N1 = N ￿ fi1g and de￿ne






. It is easy to prove that F1 is almost
strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete. F1 is therefore almost paretian, IIA, tran-
sitive and complete. By Theorem 3, F1 is either null or F1 is dictatorial and its dictator
is denoted i2.
If F1 is null, F is lexicographic dictatorship of order 1 and the proof ends. Otherwise
F2 is dictatorial and its dictator is denoted by i2.
(ii2) Suppose that there exists q voters i1, i2, ..., iq with q < n such that i1 is the
dictator of F and for all k 2 f2;:::;qg, ik is the dictator of Fk￿1 where for all k 2







Nk = N ￿fi1;i2;:::;ikg. Since F is almost strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and complete
on WN, it is easy to observe that Fq is almost strongly paretian, IIA, transitive and
complete on WNq. By Theorem 3, Fq is either null or dictatorial.
If Fq is null, F is a lexicographic dictatorship of order q and the proof ends. Otherwise
Fq is dictatorial and its dictator is denoted by iq+1.
5(ii3) By at most n iterations described at (ii1) and (ii2), F is null or is a lexicographic
dictatorship of some order q with 0 ￿ q ￿ n.
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